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Abstract. As tremendous amount of data being generated everyday
from human activity and from devices equipped with sensing capabili-
ties, cloud computing emerges as a scalable and cost-effective platform to
store and manage the data. While benefits of cloud computing are numer-
ous, security concerns arising when data and computation are outsourced
to a third party still hinder the complete movement to the cloud. In this
paper, we focus on the problem of data privacy on the cloud, particu-
larly on access controls over stream data. The nature of stream data and
the complexity of sharing data make access control a more challenging
issue than in traditional archival databases. We present Streamforce —
a system allowing data owners to securely outsource their data to the
cloud. The owner specifies fine-grained policies which are enforced by the
cloud. The latter performs most of the heavy computations, while learn-
ing nothing about the data content. To this end, we employ a number of
encryption schemes, including deterministic encryption, proxy-based at-
tribute based encryption and sliding-window encryption. In Streamforce,
access control policies are modeled as secure continuous queries, which
entails minimal changes to existing stream processing engines, and allows
for easy expression of a wide-range of policies. In particular, Streamforce
comes with a number of secure query operators including Map, Filter,
Join and Aggregate. Finally, we implement Streamforce over an open-
source stream processing engine (Esper) and evaluate its performance
on a cloud platform. The results demonstrate practical performance for
many real-world applications, and although the security overhead is vis-
ible, Streamforce is highly scalable.
1 Introduction
An enormous amount of data is being generated everyday, with sources ranging
from traditional enterprise systems to social applications. It becomes increas-
ingly common to process such data as they arrive in continuous streams. Ex-
amples range from high-frequency streams such as generated from stock or net-
work monitoring applications, to low-frequency streams originated from weather
monitoring, social network or fitness monitoring 1 applications. The variety and
abundance of data, combined with the potential of social interactivity, mash-up
1 nikeplus.nike.com, fitbit.com
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services and data sciences, has turned data sharing into a new norm. A criti-
cal problem with sharing data is security, which concerns the question of who
gets access to which aspects of the data (fine-grained access control), and under
which context (data privacy). This paper studies the former question, which we
believe to be more challenging for stream data than for archival data because
of three reasons. First, traditional archival data systems enforce access control
by pre-computing views, which is not possible with stream data because of its
infinite size. Second, access control over stream is inherently data-driven (trig-
gered by arrival of specific data values) as opposed to user-driven with archival
data, and it often involves temporal constraints (sliding windows). Third, many
of the sharing activities take place in collaborative settings which entail a large
number of users and even a larger number of policies.
At the same time, cloud computing is driving a paradigm shift in the com-
puting landscape. More businesses and individual users are taking full advantage
of the elastic, instantly available and virtually unbounded computing resources
provided by various vendors at competitive prices. Many enterprise systems are
migrating their infrastructure to the cloud, while the convenience and instant
access to computing resource also spawns a plethora of small-to-medium size
systems being developed and deployed on the cloud. In the context of stream
data sharing, cloud computing emerges as an ideal platform for two reasons.
First, data can be hosted and managed by a small number of cloud providers
with unlimited resources, which is important since data streams are of infinite
sizes. Second, data co-location makes it easy to share and to perform analytics.
However, since data is outsourced to untrusted third parties, enforcing access
control on the cloud becomes even more imperative and more challenging.
In this paper, we present Streamforce — a fine-grained access control system
for stream data over untrusted clouds. Streamforce is designed with three goals.
First, it supports specification and enforcement of fine-grained access control
policies. Second, data is outsourced to the cloud where access control policies
are enforced, with the latter learning nothing about the data content. Third,
the system is efficient, in the sense that the cloud handles most of the expensive
computations. The last two goals require the cloud to be more active than being
merely a storage facility. To realize these goals, Streamforce uses a number of
encryption schemes: deterministic encryption, proxy-based attribute based en-
cryption, and a sliding-window based encryption. While encryption is necessary
to protect data confidentiality against the cloud and against unauthorized ac-
cess, we believe that directly exposing encryption details to the system entities
(data owner, user and cloud) is not the ideal abstraction when it comes to access
control. Instead, Streamforce models access control policies using secure query
operators: secure Map, Filter, Join and Aggregate. These operators are at higher
level and more human-friendly than raw encryption keys. Enforcement at the
cloud is the same as executing the secure queries. Since existing stream process-
ing engines are very efficient at executing continuous queries made from similar
query operators, they can be leveraged by the cloud without major changes.
Streamforce occupies an unique position in the design space of outsourced
access control. It considers untrusted (semi-honest) clouds, which is different
to [4,8]. Systems such as Plutus [14] and CryptDb [18] assume untrusted clouds,
but they support only coarse-grained policies over archival data. Recent systems
utilizing attribute-based encryption [12,20] achieve more fine-grained access con-
trol on untrusted clouds, but they do not support stream data. Furthermore, the
cloud is not fully utilized as it is used mainly for storage and distribution. To the
best of our knowledge, Streamforce is the first system that allows secure, efficient
outsourcing of fine-grained access control for stream data to untrusted clouds. It
is not catered for applications demanding high throughput, but it presents im-
portant first steps towards supporting them. Our contributions are summarized
as follows:
– We present a system and formal security model for outsourcing access control
of stream data to untrusted clouds. We discuss different security levels that
different query operators can achieve.
– We present details and analyze security properties of different encryption
schemes used for fine-grained access control, including a new scheme sup-
porting sliding window aggregation.
– We show how to use these encryption schemes to construct secure query
operators: secure Map, secure Filter, secure Join and secure Aggregate.
– We implement a prototype of Streamforce [9] over Esper — a high-performance
stream processing engine. We then benchmark it on Amazon EC2. The re-
sults indicate practical performance for many applications. Although the cost
of security is evident, we show that it can be compensated by the system’s
high scalability.
Next we present the system and security model, followed by the constructions
of the encryption schemes. We then describe how to construct secure query
operators. Prototype implementation and evaluation is presented in Section 5.
Related work follows in Section 6, before we draw conclusion and discuss future
work.
2 System and Security Model
2.1 System Model
Overview. There are three types of entities: data owners (or owners), data users
(or users) and a cloud. Their interactions are illustrated in Fig. 1: the owners
encrypt their data and relay them to the cloud, which performs transformation
and forwards the results to the users for final decryption. We do not consider how
the owner determines access control policies, and we assume that the negotiation
process (in which the owner grants policies to the user) happens out-of-band.
The system goals are three-folds:
1. The owner is able to express flexible, fine-grained access control policies.
Owner
Cloud
User
policy negotiation
policy negotiation
Fig. 1: Overview of Streamforce’s deployment
2. The system ensures data confidentiality against untrusted cloud, and access
control against unauthorized users (as elaborated later).
3. Access control enforcement is done by the cloud. Decryptions at the user are
light-weight operations compared to the transformations at the cloud.
Data Model. A data stream S has the following schema:
S = (TS, A1, A2, .., An)
where TS = N is the timestamp, and all data attributes Ai are of integer do-
mains. A data tuple at time ts is written as dts = (ts, vA1 , .., vAn). Queries over
data streams are continuous, i.e. they are triggered when new data arrives. Each
query is composed from one or more query operators, which take one or more
streams as inputs and output another stream. We adopt the popular Aurora
query model [2], and focus on four operators: Map, Join and Aggregate.
– Map: outputs only the specified attributes.
– Filter : outputs tuples satisfying a given predicate.
– Join: takes as inputs two streams (S1, S2), two integers (ws1,ws2) and a join
attribute. Incoming data are added to the queues of size ws1 and ws2, from
which they are joined together.
– Aggregate: outputs the averages over a sliding window. A sliding window is
defined over the timestamp attribute, with a window size ws and an advance
step step.
Access Control via Queries. In Streamforce, access control is defined via
views. As in traditional archival database systems, views are created by querying
the database. In our settings, the access control process involves two steps. First,
the owner specifies a policy by mapping it into a continuous query. Second, the
query is registered to be executed by the cloud, whose outputs are then forwarded
to authorized users.
The example depicted in Fig. 2 includes two streams: Svs = (TS, RTime,
Name, HR, BP) and Sfn =(TS, RTime, Name, Cals, Act, Loc). Svs contains
Filter
(HR>150)
Filter
(BP<100)
(Name, Cals, Act)
S_{vs}
S_{fn} Map Join
(Name)
Q_0
Q_1
Filter
(TS>50)
Aggregate
(ws=60, adv=60)
Q_2
Fig. 2: Examples of access control policies via queries
owner’s vital signs as produced by health monitoring devices, where RTime, HR,
BP are the real time, heart rate and blood pressure respectively. Sfn contains
fitness information, where Cals, Act Loc are the number of calories burned,
the activity and the owner’s location respectively. Data users could be friends
from social network, research institutes or insurance companies. For a friend,
the owner may want to share vitals data when they exceed a certain threshold
(Q0), or average fitness information every hour (Q2). A research institute may
be given a joined view from both streams in order to monitor the individual’s
vitals during exercises (Q1).
2.2 Security Model
Adversary Model. The cloud is not trusted, in the sense that it tries to learn
content of the outsourced data, but it follows the protocol correctly. This passive
(or semi-honest) adversary model reflects the cloud’s incentives to gain benefits
from user data while being bound by the service level agreements. We do not
consider malicious cloud, which may try to break data integrity, launch denial
of service attacks, or compute using stale data. Security against such attacks is
crucial for many applications, but it is out of the scope of this paper. Data users
are considered dishonest, in the sense that they may proactively try to access
unauthorized data. To this end, they may collude with each other and also with
the cloud.
Encryptions Model. To meet both fine-grained access control and data con-
fidentiality requirements, we use three different encryption schemes. Proxy at-
tribute based encryption is used for Map and Filter operators. Second, Join oper-
ator is possible via deterministic encryption. Aggregate is supported by sliding-
window encryption. This section provides formal definition of these schemes and
their security properties. Detailed constructions and proofs of security are pre-
sented in Section 3.
Deterministic encryption scheme. Ed = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a private-key
encryption scheme, where:
– Gen(κ) generates secret key SK using security parameter κ.
– Enc(m,SK) encrypts message m with SK.
– Dec(CT,SK) decrypts the ciphertext.
For any message m, Dec(Enc(m,Gen(κ))) = m. Security of Ed is defined via the
security game consisting of three phases: Setup, Challenge, Guess
– Setup: the challenger runs Gen(.).
– Challenge: the adversary sends to the challenger two messages:M0 = (m0,0,m0,1, ..)
and M1 = (m1,0,m1,1, ..), such that |M0| = |M1| and mi,j are all distinct.
The challenger chooses b
R←− {0, 1}, runs Enc(Mb,SK) and returns the ci-
phertext to the adversary.
– Guess: the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
The adversary Adv is said to have an advantage AdvκA = |Pr[b = b′]− 12 |.
Definition 1. Ed is said to be secure with respect to deterministic chosen plain-
text attacks, or Det-CPA secure, if the adversary advantage is negligible.
Proxy Attribute-Based Encryption scheme. Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) is a public-key scheme that allows for fine-grained access control: cipher-
texts can only be decrypted if the security credentials satisfy a certain predicate.
There are two types of ABE [12]: Key-Policy (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy
(CP-ABE). We opt for the former, in which the predicate is embedded in user
keys and the ciphertext contains a set of encryption attributes. KP-ABE and
CP-ABE can be used interchangeably, but the former is more data-centric (who
gets access to the given data), while the latter is more user-centric (which data
the given user has access to).
ABE’s encryption and decryption are expensive operations. Proxy Attribute
Based Encryption [13] (or proxy ABE) is design to aid the decryption process
by letting a third party transform the original ABE ciphertexts into a simpler
form. It consists of five algorithms Ep = (Gen,KeyGen,Enc,Trans,Dec):
– Gen(κ): generates public parameters PK and master key MK.
– KeyGen(MK, P ): creates a transformation key TK and a decryption key SK
for the predicate P .
– Enc(m,PK, A): encrypts m with the set of encryption attributes A.
– Trans(TK,CT): partially decrypts the ciphertext using TK.
– Dec(SK,CT): decrypts the transformed ciphertext using the decryption key.
For any message m, attribute set A, policy P , MK ← Gen(κ), (TK,SK) ←
KeyGen(MK, P ), the following holds:
P (A) = 1⇔ Dec(SK,Trans(TK,Enc(m,A))) = m
Security of Ep is defined in [13] via a selective-set security game, consisting of
five phase: Setup, Query-1, Challenge, Query-2, Guess:
– Setup: the challenger executes Gen(.) to generate public parameters. It gives
PK and an attribute set A to the adversary.
– Query-1: the adversary performs either private key query or decryption query.
In the former, it asks the challenger for the keys of an access structure T . The
challenger calls KeyGen to generates (TK,SK). If T (A) = 0, it sends both
(TK,SK) to the adversary. If T (A) = 1, it sends TK to the adversary. For
decryption query, the adversary asks the challenger to decrypt a ciphertext
CT′ (which has been transformed using a key TK. The challenger retrieves
the corresponding SK, and calls Dec(SK,CT′) and sends the result back to
the adversary.
– Challenge: the adversary sends two message m0,m1 of equal length to the
challenger. The challenger chooses b
R←− {0, 1}, computes CT ← Enc(mb, A)
and returns CT to the adversary.
– Query-2: the adversary continues the queries like in Query-1, except that it
cannot ask the challenger to decrypt CT.
– Guess: the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 2. The scheme Ep is said to be secure with respect to replayable
chosen ciphertext attacks, or R-CCA secure, in the selective-set model if the
adversary advantage in the selective-set security game is negligible.
Modify the security game so that the adversary does not issue decryption
queries. We say that Ep is secure in the selective-set model with respect to chosen
plaintext attacks (or CPA secure) if the adversary advantage is negligible.
Sliding-window encryption scheme (SWE). Ew = (Gen,Enc,Dec) is a
private-key encryption scheme which allows an user to decrypt only the aggregate
of a window of ciphertexts, and not the individual ciphertexts. Let s(M,ws)[i]
and p(M,ws)[i] be the sum and product of the ith window sliding windows (size
ws and advance step step = ws) over a sequence M .
– Gen(κ): generates public parameters and the private keys.
– Enc(M = 〈m0,m1, ..,mn−1〉,W ): encrypts M using a set of window sizes W ,
whose result is CT = 〈c0, c1, c2, ..〉.
– Dec(ws, CT,SKws) decrypts CT for the window size ws using the private key
SKws. The result is the aggregates of the sliding window, i.e. s(M,ws)[i] for
all i.
Security of Ew is defined via a selective-window security game consisting of four
phases: Setup, Corrupt, Challenge, Guess.
– Setup: the challenger calls Gen(.) to setup public parameters. It chooses a
value ws and sends it to the adversary.
– Corrupt: the adversary asks the challenger for the private key of a window
size ws′, provided that gcd(ws,ws′) = ws.
– Challenge: the adversary picks M0 = 〈m0,0,m0,1, ..,m0,n−1〉 and M1 =
〈m1,0,m1,1, ..,m1,n−1〉, such that s(M0,ws)[i] = s(M1,ws)[i] for all i and
sends them to the challenger. The adversary also sends a set of window sizes
W . The challenger chooses b
R←− {0, 1}, invokes Enc(Mb,W ) and forwards
the result to the adversary.
– Guess: the adversary outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 3. Ew is said to be secure with respect to restricted chosen encrypted
window attacks (or Res-CEW secure) in the selective-window model if the
adversary’s advantage is negligible. It is secure with respect to chosen window
attacks (or CW secure) when the Corrupt phase is removed from the game.
2.3 Discussion
The encryption schemes above have a different definition of security which makes
different assumptions about the adversary’s capabilities. R-CCA is the strongest
definition, as it assumes active adversary that has access to the decryption or-
acles. R-CCA ensures both data integrity and confidentiality. CPA security as-
sumes a passive (eavesdropping) adversary who only tries to break the secrecy
property of the ciphertext. CPA security ensures confidentiality, while allow-
ing meaningful changes to be made on the ciphertext (which is necessary for
transformation to work). Det-CPA is a weaker security level, as it protects data
confidentiality only for unique messages.
Security of the sliding-window scheme Ew is related to that of secure multi-
party computation, which ensures that no other information is leaked during the
computation of a function except from the final output. Our model is similar,
but stronger than the aggregator oblivious model proposed in [19], since the
security game allows for more types of adversarial attacks. More specifically,
[19] requires the two message sequences M0 and M1 to have the same aggregate,
but our model requires only the windows (sub-sequences) of M0 and M1 to
have the same aggregate. Both Res-CEW and CW security allow for meaningful
computations (aggregate) over ciphertexts. Res-CEW is secure against a weak
form of collusion (between users with access to window sizes which are multiples
of each others), whereas CW is not.
Access control via Encryption. Encryption plays two roles in our system:
protecting data confidentiality against untrusted cloud, and providing access
control against unauthorized users. Neither of cloud nor the unauthorized user
have access to decryption keys, hence they cannot learn the plaintexts. In ad-
dition, Res-CEW and CW security ensure that given access to a window size
ws, the user cannot learn information of other window sizes (except from what
can be derived from its own window). Res-CEW guarantees access control under
weak collusion among dishonest users.
For access control to be enforced by the cloud, some information must be re-
vealed to the latter. There exists a trade-off between security and functionality
of the query operators that make up the policies. For Map and Filter policies,
the cloud must be able to check if certain attributes are included in the cipher-
texts, which is allowed by CPA security. For Join, the cloud needs to be able to
compare if two ciphertexts are encryptions of the same message, which requires
the encryption to be deterministic (or Det-CPA secure). For Aggregate, a ho-
momorphic encryption is required, which in our case means the highest security
level is Res-CEW.
3 Encryption Scheme Constructions
3.1 Deterministic Encryption
Let G be a multiplicative group of prime order p and generator g. Let F :
Zp × {0, 1}∗ → G be a pseudorandom permutation with outputs in G. The
scheme Ed is constructed as follows.
– Gen(κ): SK = (k1, k2) where k1, k2
R←− Zp.
– Enc(m,SK): CT = F (k1,m)
k2 .
– Dec(CT,SK): m = F−1(k1,CT
1
k2 ).
Theorem 1. Assume that F is a pseudorandom permutation, Ed is Det-CPA
secure
Proof sketch. Given anym0,0,m0,1, .. which are distinct, F (k1,m0,0), F (k1,m0,1), ..
are independent and uniformly distributed. As a consequence, F (k1,m0,0)
k2 , F (k1,m0,1)
k2 , ..
are also independent and indistinguishable from random. It follows that CT is
independent from the choice of M0 or M1, therefore Pr[b = b
′] = 12 , or the
adversary advantage is 0. uunionsq
3.2 Proxy ABE Construction
Since our adversary model assume passive attackers, we present here the CPA
secure construction as proposed in [13] (a R-CCA secure construction can be
found in the original paper). The scheme makes use of bilinear map e : G1×G1 →
G2 where G1,G2 are multiplicative, cyclic groups of prime order p. e is efficient
to compute, and e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab for u, v ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Zp. Its security
relies on the bilinear decisional Diffie Hellman assumption: let g be the generator
of G1, for all a, b, c, z
R←− Zp, it is difficult to distinguish e(g, g)abc from e(g, g)z.
Gen(κ): generates groups and the bilinear map as the public key. Let U be
the attribute universe, and t1, t2, .., tU
R←− Zp. We have:
PK = (g, p,G1,G2, e, T1 = gt1 , .., TU = gtU )
Let y
R←− Zp, the master key MK is: MK = (y, t1, .., tU ).
KeyGen(MK, P ): translates P into an access tree, in which the leaf nodes
represent attributes U ′ ⊆ U , and the internal nodes represent threshold gates.
An AND node corresponds to a 2-out-of-N gate, an OR nodes to a 1-out-of-
N gate. For each k-out-of-N node x we define a (k − 1)-degree polynomial qx.
Starting from the root node r, defines the polynomial with qr(0) = y. Recursively,
for a child node x, define qx such that qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)). When x is a
leaf node, let zu
R←− Zp define:
Dx = g
qx(0)
zu.ta(x)
where a(x) returns the attribute in U represented by the leaf node. The trans-
formation key TK and decryption key SK are defined as follows:
TK = {Dx | a(x) ∈ U ′}, SK = zu
Enc(m,PK, A): assume m ∈ G1 (or has been mapped from a string to a group
element). Let s
R←− Zp, the ciphertext is:
CT = (A,E = m.e(g, g)y.s, E′ = {T sx |x ∈ A})
Trans(TK,CT): given the access tree used to generate TK, when x is a leaf
node, compute:
Transform(x) ={
e(Ta(x), Da(x)) = e(g, g)
s.qx(0)
zu when a(x) ∈ A
⊥ otherwise
When x is a non-leaf node, let Fz be the result from recursive call to Transform(z)
and z is a child node of x. Let Sx be the set of x’s children such that Fz 6= ⊥ for
z ∈ Sx. Let ∆i,S(x) =
∏
j∈S,j 6=i
x−j
i−j be the Lagrange coefficient for i ∈ Zp, S ⊆
Zp. We compute:
Transform(x) = Fx
=
∏
z∈Sx
F
∆index(w),S′x (0)
z for S
′
x = {index(z) | z ∈ Sx}
= e(g, g)
s.qx(0)
zu
Thus, calling Transform(r) for the root node r results in
CT′ = (U, V ) = (E, Transform(r)) = (E, e(g, g)
y.s
zu )
Dec(SK,CT′): the message can be recovered as:
m =
U
V zu
Theorem 2 ([13]). Ep is CPA-secure in the selective-set model.
3.3 Sliding-Window Encryption
Let W be the set of all possible window sizes, G be a multiplicative group of
prime order p and generator g. Assuming the message space is a small integer
domain, we propose three different constructions for SWE.
Construction 1 (E1w): masks the plaintext with random values whose sum
over the sliding window is the user decryption key.
– Gen(κ): for all ws ∈ W, SKws R←− Zp.
– Enc(M,W ): for each ws ∈ W , let R = (r0, r1, .., r|M |) such that ri R←− Zp
and s(R,ws)[i] = SKws. The ciphertext is CT =
⋃
ws CTws where CTws =
(gm0+r0 , gm1+r1 , ..).
– Dec(ws,CT,SKws): extracts CTws from CT and compute:
s(M,ws)[i] = dLog
(
p(CTws,ws)[i]
gSKws
)
Theorem 3. The scheme E1w is Res-CEW secure.
Proof sketch. Given input X = (x0, x1, ..xn), window size ws and key SKws,
define two distributions P0 and P1 as:
P0(ws) = (g
x0+r0 , gx1+r1 , .., gxn+rn)
P1(ws) = (R0, R1, .., Rn)
where ri
R←− Zp and Ri R←− G such that for all i:∏
j∈ws[i]
Rj =
∏
j∈ws[i]
gxj+rj = gSKws+s(X,ws)[i]
It can be seen that P0 and P1 are indistinguishable (in the information theoretic
sense), because ri is chosen at random and independently of xi.
Consider the single-window case, i.e. W = {ws}. In the security game,
P0 is the distribution of ciphertext for the input X. For input M0, this dis-
tribution is indistinguishable from D0 = (R0, R1, ..Rn) where
∏
j∈ws[i]Rj =
gSKws+s(M0,ws)[i]. For input M1, the ciphertext distribution is indistinguishable
from D1 = (R
′
0, R
′
1, .., R
′
n) where
∏
j∈ws[i]R
′
j = g
SKws+s(M1,ws)[i]. Since
s(M0,ws)[i] = s(M1,ws)[i], D0 and D1 are the same distribution. Therefore, the
adversary can only distinguish the two ciphertext distributions with probability
1
2 .
Consider the case with multiple windows where gcd(ws,ws′) = ws for all
ws′ ∈ W . P0(ws) and P0(ws′) are independent, because the random values
ri, r
′
i are chosen independently. They are indistinguishable from P1(ws) and
P1(ws
′), which are also independent. Consequently, the combined distribution
(P0(ws
′)|ws′ ∈ W ) and (P1(ws′)|ws′ ∈ W ) are indistinguishable. Similar to the
single-window case above, using the fact that s(M0,ws
′)[i] = s(M1,ws′)[i], the
adversary can only distinguish the two ciphertext distributions with probability
1
2 .uunionsq
Construction 2 (E2w): uses an auxiliary encryption scheme to encrypt the
window aggregates directly.
– Gen(κ): let Eaux = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be a CPA-secure asymmetric encryp-
tion scheme. For all ws ∈ W, invokes Eaux.Gen(κ) to generate a key pair
(PKws,SKws).
– Enc(M,W ): CT =
⋃
ws∈W Eaux.Enc(PKws, s(M,ws)[i]).
– Dec(ws,CT,SKws): extracts CTws from CT, then computes s(M,ws)[i] =
Eaux.Dec(SKws,CTws[i])
Theorem 4. Assuming that Eaux is CPA-secure, the construction E2w is Res-
CEW secure.
Proof sketch. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 5. Because Eaux is CPA-
secure, its ciphertext distribution is independent of the input and is indistin-
guishable from random. Hence, given SKws′ for all ws
′ ∈ W and gcd(ws,ws′) =
ws, both ciphertext distributions D(M0) and D(M1) are indistinguishable from
the following distribution:
(R0, R1, .., s(M0,ws
′)[0], s(M0,ws′)[1], ..)
where Ri
R←− G. uunionsq
Construction 3 (E3w): masks the plaintexts with random values whose sums
over the sliding window are encrypted using another encryption scheme.
– Gen(κ): the same as in E2w.
– Enc(M,W ): letR = (r0, r1, .., r|M |−1) where ri
R←− Zp, let CT0 = (gm0+r0 , gm1+r1 , ..).
For all ws ∈ W , let CTws[i] = Eaux.Enc(PKws, s(R,ws)[i]). Finally, CT =
CT0 ∪
⋃
ws∈W CTws.
– Dec(ws,CT,SKws): extracts CTws from CT, then computes
s(M,ws)[i] = dLog
(
p(CT0,ws)[i]
gEaux.Dec(SKws,CTws[i])
)
Theorem 5. Assuming that Eaux is CPA-secure, the scheme E3w is Res-CEW
secure.
Proof sketch. Given W and X = (x0, x1, ..), consider the ciphertext distribu-
tion:
D0(X) = (g
x0+r0 , gx1+r1 , ..,CTws′ [0],CTws′ [1], .. |ws′ ∈W )
Because ri is chosen independently from xi,D0 is indistinguishable fromD1(X) =
(R0, R1, ..,CTws′ [0],CTws′ [1]..) where Ri
R←− G.
Let R = {R0, R1, ..}, given SK′ws for all ws′ ∈ W and gcd(ws′,ws) = ws, D1
becomes:
D2(X) = (R0, R1, ..,
gs(X,ws
′)[0]
p(R,ws′)[0] ,
gs(X,ws
′)[1]
p(R,ws′)[1] , ..,
CTws∗ [0], .. | gcd(ws∗,ws) 6= ws)
Since Eaux is CPA-secure, it follows that CTws∗[i] is independent from its input
and indistinguishable from random. That is, D2 is indistinguishable from D3:
D3(X) = (R0, R1, ..,
gs(X,ws
′)[0]
p(R,ws′)[0] ,
gs(X,ws
′)[1]
p(R,ws′)[1] , .., T0, T1, ..)
where Ti
R←− G.
Given the challenge M0 and M1, the ciphertext distribution is D3(M0) and
D3(M1) respectively. Since, g
s(M0,ws
′)[i] = gs(M1,ws
′)[i] for all 0 ≤ i < b |M0|ws′ c and
ws′ ∈W such that gcd(ws′,ws) = ws, D3(M0) is the same as D3(M1). Therefore,
the adversary can only distinguish the two distributions with probability 12 . uunionsq
4 Secure Query Operators
The encryption schemes discussed in previous sections provide the underlying se-
curity assurance for Streamforce. Using encryption directly, access control can be
implemented by distributing decryption keys to the authorized users. Stream-
force exposes a higher-level abstraction: system entities deal only with secure
query operators which hide the complex and mundane cryptographic details.
This section focuses on the implementation of the secure operators using the
encryption schemes from previous sections. There are three design components
pertaining each operator: (1) how to map the corresponding policy to user de-
cryption key, (2) how to encrypt the data at the owner, (3) how the transfor-
mation at the cloud is done. Many fine-grained policies can be constructed by
using one of these operators directly. We also describe the design for combining
these operators to support more complex policies.
4.1 Map
This operator returns data tuples containing only attributes in a given set B.
We use Ep to implement this operator. First, Ep.Gen(.) is invoked to setup the
public parameters and master key MK. The user decryption key is created by
Ep.KeyGen(MK, P-Map(B)), where:
P-Map(B) = (‘att = B1’ ∩ ‘att = B2’ ∩ ..)
The owner encrypts using:
Enc-Map(dts) =
(
ts, Ep.Enc(vA1 , {‘att = A1’}), Ep.Enc(vA2 , {‘att = A2’}), ..
)
When the ciphertext CT arrives at the cloud, it is transformed using Ep.Trans(TK,CT)
before being forwarded to the user.
This implementation achieves the same level of security as Ep, i.e. CPA se-
curity in the selective set model. The storage cost is O(|A|.log(p)) bits per data
tuple, where p is the size of G.
4.2 Filter
Let FA be the set of filter attributes. A filter predicate is defined by a tuple
(A, k, op) in which k ∈ Z, A ∈ A, op ∈ {‘ = ’, ‘ ≤ ’, ‘ ≥ ’, ‘mod p’}. The pred-
icate returns true when (A op k) returns true. Let λ(A, v, b) be the bag-of-bit
representation of vA in base b, as explained in [12]. In particular, assuming
v = (y0y1..ym−1)b, we have:
λ(A, v, b) =

‘attA,b,0 = (xx..xy0)b’
‘attA,b,1 = (xx..y1x)b’
· · ·
‘attA,b,m−1 = (ym−1x..x)b’

Let P be a set of primes, define
AS(A, v) =
⋃
b∈P
λ(A, v, b) ∪ {‘attA = don’t care ’}
as the set of encryption attributes representing the value v.
cond ge(A, s, i):
if (i == 1) AND s[0] ==′ 0′)
return ‘attA,2,1 = xx..1x’
else
if (s[i] == ‘0’)
return ‘attA,2,i = x.. 1x..x︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
’ ∪ cond ge(s, i− 1)
else if (i == 0) return ‘attA,2,0 = x..x1’
else return ‘attA,2,i = x.. 1x..x︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
’ ∩ cond ge(s, i− 1)
Algorithm 1: Generate policy condition when op is ≥.
cond le(A, s, i):
if (i == 0) return ‘attA,2,0 = x..x0’
else
if (s[i] == ‘0’)
return ‘attA,2,i = x.. 0x..x︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
’ ∩ cond le(s, i− 1)
else return ‘attA,2,i = x.. 0x..x︸ ︷︷ ︸
i
’ ∪ cond le(s, i− 1)
Algorithm 2: Generate policy condition when op is ≤
Denote D(A, k, op) as the policy corresponding to the predicate (A, k, op).
When op is ‘ = ’,D(A, k, ‘ = ’)← ⋂P∈λ(A,k,2) P . When op ∈ {≤,≥},D(A, k, op)←
cond le(A, (ym−1..y0)2,m− 1) or D(A, k, op) ← cond ge(A, (ym−1..y0),m− 1)
where cond le and cond ge are detailed in Alg. 2 and Alg. 1 respectively.
When op is ‘mod p’, we consider three cases.
– If p ∈ P: D(A, k, ‘mod p’)← ‘attA,p,0 = (xx..xk′)p’ where k′ = k mod p.
– If there exists q ∈ P and p = qt for some t. Let k′ = (yt−1..y1y0)q be the
representation of k′ = k mod p in base q. Let
D(A, k, ‘mod p’) =
⋂
‘attA,q,0 = (xx.xy0)q’
· · ·
‘attA,q,t−1 = (x.. yt−1x..x︸ ︷︷ ︸
t
)q’

– p = qt11 q
t2
2 ..q
tm
m for qi ∈ P and some values of ti. Then, we haveD(A, k, ‘mod p’)←⋂
iD(A, k mod q
ti
i , mod q
ti
i ).
The user decryption key is generated by Ep.KeyGen
(
MK, P-Filter
({(A, k, op)})),
where
P-Filter
({(A, k, op)}) = ⋂
A∈FA
D(A, k, op)
The owner encrypts data using:
Enc-Filter(dts) =
(
{vA |A ∈ FA}, Ep.Enc
(
d,
⋃
A∈FA
AS(A, vA)
))
When the ciphertext CT arrives at the cloud, the latter transforms it using
Ep.Trans(TK,CT) and forwards the result to the user.
Similar to Map, this operator uses proxy ABE scheme directly, therefore it
has CPA security in the selective set model. The storage cost per ciphertext is
O(|FA|.|P|.log(p)) bits, which grows with the size of P. The bigger the size of P,
the more policies of the type ‘ mod p ’ can be supported, but at the expense of
more storage overhead. Notice that values of filtering attributes are exposed to
the cloud in the form of encryption attributes, thus the data owner should only
use non-sensitive attributes, such as TS, for the set FA.
4.3 Join
Let J be the join attributes of two streams S1, S2. We assume that the join oper-
ator returns all data attributes (more complex cases are discussed in Section 4.5).
We use a combination of proxy ABE scheme Ep and deterministic scheme Ed.
Initially, the two owners of S1, S2 invoke Ed.Gen(.) in a way that satisfies two
conditions: (1) both end up with the same group G and pseudorandom function
F ; (2) SK1 = (k1,1, k1,2) and SK2 = (k2,1, k2,2) are the two secret keys such that
k1,1 = k2,1.
The user decryption for stream i is
(
ki,2, Ep.KeyGen(MK, P-Join(J))
)
, where
P-Join(J) = ‘att = J ’
The owner encrypts using:
Enc-Join(dts, J) = (U, V ) =
(
Ep.Enc(d, ‘att = J ’), Ed.Enc(vJ)
)
The user who received both k1,2 and k2,2 computes (z1 =
s
k1,2
, z2 =
s
k2,2
) where
s
R←− Zp and sends it to the cloud. When two ciphertexts (U1, V1) and (U2, V2)
arrive at the cloud, it checks if V z11 = V
z2
2 . If true, the ciphertexts can be joined.
The cloud then performs Ep.Trans(TK1, U1), Ep.Trans(TK2, U2) and forwards the
results to the user.
Because Ed is Det-CPA secure, the cloud can learn if the encryption of vJ is
the same as in both streams. But this check is only possible if the user requests
it (by sending z1 and z2 to the cloud). Other attributes in dts are protected
with CPA security by Ep. The storage requirement is O(log(p)) bits per data
tuple, because Ed.Enc(.) produces a group element and Ep encrypts the entire
data tuple with only one encryption attribute.
4.4 Aggregate (Sliding Window)
Enc-1(i, d):
forall ws ∈ W:
if (i mod ws < ws− 1)
r
R←− Zp;
else
r ← SKws − sws;
CTws = g
r+d.vAg ;
sws ← sws + r;
return {CTws};
(a)
Enc-2(i, d, Ep):
CT = ∅;
forall ws ∈ W
sws ← sws + d.vAg ;
if (i mod ws = ws− 1)
CT = CT ∪ Ep.Enc(sws, {‘att = Ag’, ‘window = ws’});
sws ← 0;
return CT;
(b)
Enc-3(d):
r
R←− Zp;
s∗ ← s∗ + r;
return (gr+d.vAg , gs
∗
);
(c)
Fig. 3: Encryption used for aggregate protocols
In Streamforce, sliding windows are based on timestamp attribute TS, with
advance steps being the same as the window sizes. Let Ag be the aggregate
attribute, over which the sums are computed. In the following, we present three
implementations for this operator, and discuss their trade-offs at the end.
Agg-1. The owner first encrypts data using E1w, the ciphertext is then encrypted
with Ep. The user decryption key is
(
SKws, Ep.KeyGen(MK, P-Agg1(ws, Ag))
)
, where
SK is the secret key generated by E1w.Gen(.), and
P-Agg1(ws, Ag) = ‘att = Ag’ ∩ ‘window = ws’
To encrypt dts, the owner first executes Enc-1(ts, dts) → {CTws} as shown in
Fig. 3[a], then computes:
Enc-Agg1(dts, {CTws}) =
(
Ep.Enc(d, {‘window = 1’}),
⋃
ws∈W
Ep.Enc(CTws, {‘att = Ag’, ‘window = ws’})
)
For every window size ws, the cloud maintains a buffer of size ws. The incoming
ciphertext CT is transformed using Ep.Trans(.), and the result is added to the
buffer. Once the buffer is filled, the cloud computes the product of its elements,
sends the result to the user and clears the buffer.
Agg-2. This implementation uses E2w with Ep as the auxiliary encryption scheme.
The owner itself computes the window aggregates and encrypts the result using
Ep. User decryption key is Ep.KeyGen(MK, P-Agg2(ws, Ag)), where:
P-Agg2(ws, Ag) = ‘att = Ag’ ∩ ‘window = ws’
To encrypt dts, the owner first executes Enc-2(ts, dts, Ep) → CT as shown in
Fig. 3[b], then the ciphertext is computed as:
Enc-Agg2(dts) =
(
Ep.Enc(dts, {‘window = 1’}), CT
)
At the cloud, the ciphertexts for a window aggregate are of the same form as
for a normal data tuple. The cloud simply invokes Ep.Trans(CTws,TKws) and
forwards the results to the user.
Agg-3. This implementation uses E3w with Ep as the auxiliary encryption scheme.
The user key is Ep.KeyGen(MK, P-Agg3(ws, Ag)), where:
P-Agg3(ws, Ag) = ‘att = Ag’ ∪ D(TS,ws− 1, ‘mod ws’)
To encrypt dts, the owner first computes Enc-3(dts) → (U, V ) as shown in
Fig. 3[c] where s∗ R←− Zp is a public parameter. The ciphertext is:
Enc-Agg3(dts) =
(
ts, Ep.Enc(vAg , {‘window = 1’}), Ep.Enc(U, {‘att = Ag’}), Ep.Enc
(
V,AS(TS, i)
))
The cloud maintains a ws-size buffer, and a variable X whose initial value
is (gs
∗
, 1). For the incoming ciphertext CT = (ts, U, V, Z), the cloud performs
Ep.Trans(TK, V ) and adds the result to the buffer. Once the buffer is filled
(at index ts), the cloud computes the product U ′ of the buffer elements and
clears the buffer. Next, it computes V ′ ← Ep.Trans(TK,Z)X , and then assign X ←
V ′. Finally, it sends (U ′, V ′) to the user, at which the sum is decrypted as:
dLog
( Ep.Dec(SK,U ′)
Ep.Dec(SK,V ′)
)
Discussion. Unlike Map, Filter and Join, the Aggregate operator requires
more effort from the cloud, i.e. multiplication of ciphertexts. Since it uses Ep as
the final layer of encryption, it achieves CPA security with respect to the cloud.
In all three implementations, the transformed ciphertexts received by the user
are data encrypted with E1w, E2w or E3w. As discussed in the previous section, these
schemes achieve Res-CEW security, therefore the user learns nothing more than
the aggregate values.
While both security with respect to the cloud and access control property
are the same for the three protocols, their main differences lie in their flexibility
and storage cost:
– Flexibility : Agg-1 and Agg-2 support a fixed set of window sizes, as defined
by W . Agg-3, however, specifies a set of prime P and is able to support any
window size ws which can be factorized into the form (ws = qt11 .q
t2
2 ..) for
all qi ∈ P and ti ∈ N. For instance, with P = {2, 3, 5}, Agg-3 can support
any window size in {2, 3, 5, 4, 6, 8, 9, 20, 23, ..}. Finally, Agg-3 allows the data
owners to specify windows starting from arbitrary positions, as opposed to
the fixed starting position {0,ws, 2.ws, ..} for windows of size ws. For this
usage, however, the security model must be extended to deal with collusion
not only from users whose policies permit access for different window sizes,
but also from users having access to the same window sizes but from different
starting positions.
– Storage cost : In Agg-1, each data tuple needs to be encrypted W times, each
for a different window size. Hence, its cost is O(|W |.log(p)) bit per encrypted
data tuple. In Agg-2, encrypting data tuple di may follow by encryptions of
window sums for windows that ends at i. In the worst case, the cost for
encryption of di is O(|W |.log(p). Notice that even though both protocols
have the same asymptotic cost, bound for memory cost, the cost incurred by
Agg-2 is much cheaper in practice, because most of the time di requires only
one encryption, whereas Agg-1 always requires W encryptions for all di. In
Agg-3, even though each di requires only two encryptions, each encryption
requires bigger storage for all the attributes in AS(TS, i). Hence, its memory
cost is O(|P|.log(p)).
It can be seen that there is a trade-off between flexibility and storage over-
head. In particular, when the owner wishes to support a small number of win-
dows, Agg-2 is a better choice among the three. However, when more flexible
windows are required, Agg-3 may have a better trade-off between flexibility and
storage cost. Our experimentation with Streamforce in Section 5 suggests that
this is indeed the case.
4.5 Combining Multiple Operators
Each operator presented above can be used by itself to support a wide range of
fine-grained policies. However, many more policies can be supported when two
or more of these operators are combined together. In the following, we show how
to implement such high-level combinations.
Map and Filter. The user decryption key is generated by combining the Map
and Filter key, i.e. Ep.Gen
(
MK, P-Map(B), P-Filter({A, k, op})). The owner en-
crypts using:
MF-Enc(dts) =
(
ts, {vA |A ∈ FA}, Ep.Enc(vA1 , A∗1), Ep.Enc(vA2 , A∗2), ..
)
where A∗i = {‘att = A1’} ∪
⋃
A∈FAAS(A, va) This operator is CPA secure, and
the storage cost is O(A.|FA|.|P|.log(p)) bits per data tuple.
Map, Filter and Join. This operator allows the cloud to join two encrypted
streams only when filter conditions on each stream are met. The user decryption
key is made up of the Map-Filter key and the Join key, i.e:(
ki,2, Ep.KeyGen
(
MK, P-Join(J)
)
, Ep.Gen
(
MK, P-Map(B), P-Filter({A, k, op})))
The data owner encrypts using:
MFJ-Enc(dts) =
(
{vA |A ∈ FA}, MF-Enc(dts), Ep.Enc
(Ed.Enc(vJ))
This operator is Det-CPA secure, and its storage cost is dominated by the cost
of MF-Enc, which is O(A.|FA|.|P|.log(p)) bits per data tuple.
Filter and Aggregate. We assume that each sliding window contains only
continuous elements, i.e. {dts, dts+1, .., dts+ws−1}. Therefore, combining Filter
and Aggregate only applies to filtering conditions of the form (TS, k, ‘ ≥ ’) for
k ∈ Z. When Agg-2 is used, the user decryption key is:(
Ep.KeyGen
(
MK, P-Agg2(ws, Ag)
)
, Ep.KeyGen
(
MK, P-Filter({TS, k, ‘ ≥ ’})))
To encrypt dts, the owner simply invokes Enc-Agg2(dts). Thus, this operator
has the same security level as that of Agg-2: CPA security against the cloud
and Res-CEW security against users. The memory cost is O(|W |.log(p)) bits per
data tuple.
When Agg-3 is used, the user key is created by Ep.KeyGen(MK, FA-Policy(ws, Ag, x))
where:
FA-Policy(ws, Ag, x) =
(
‘att = Ag’ ∩ D(TS, x, ‘ ≥ ’)
)
∪ (‘att = TS’ ∩ D(TS, x− 1, ‘ ≥ ’) ∩ D(TS, x− 1, ‘mod ws’))
The encryption of dts is:
FA-Enc(i, di) =
(
i, Ep.Enc(vAg , {‘window = 1’}),
Ep.Enc(U, {‘att = Ag’} ∪ AS(TS, i)),
Ep.Enc(V, {‘att = TS’} ∪ AS(TS, i))
)
where (U, V ) is output of Enc-3(dts). The implementation of Aggregate box is
modified slightly as follows. The cloud will only start transforming and filling
the buffer when i = x. In addition, when x = 0, the initial value of X is (gs
∗
, 1)
as before. When x > 0, the cloud waits to receive the ciphertext (x− 1, U, V, Z)
and then initializes X ← Ep.Trans(TK, Z). The memory cost is O(|W |.log(p)).
5 Prototype and Evaluation
5.1 Implementation and Benchmark
We implement a prototype of Streamforce [9] over Esper2. Esper is an open
source stream processing engine which can process millions of data items per
2 esper.codehause.org
Policy Description Esper query
T1 select certain stock select * from StockEvent(stockId=x)
T2 stock within timestamp range select * from StockEvent(stockId=x, y < ts < z)
T3 stock within time interval select * from StockEvent(stockId=x, y < hour < z)
T4 stock every fixed interval select * from StockEvent(stockId=x, ts%x = y)
T5
aggregate (Agg-1,3) select price(’ws=l’), volume(’ws=l’) from StockEvent(stockId=x).win:length batch(y)
aggregate (Agg-2) select price(’ws=l’), volume(’ws=l’) from StockEvent(stockId=x)
T6 join price
select * from StockEvent(stockId=x, y < ts < z) //output StockJoinEvent stream
select * from StockJoinEvent(policyId=p).win:length(l1) as s1,
StockJoinEvent(policyId=p).win:length(l2) as s2 where s1.price(’det’)=s2.price(’det’)
Table 1: Access control policies
second. One can register a continuous query to Esper, then implement a lis-
tener that processes the output stream. In Streamforce, policies are translated
into queries (Table 1), and transformations for each policy are done at the cor-
responding listener. We leverage Esper to manage policies, to quickly process
the ciphertext streams (i.e. direct the ciphertext to the correct listener), and to
handle the complex join operation. We use OpenSSL’s AES implementation for
deterministic encryption scheme, while proxy ABE and sliding window schemes
are implemented by extending the KP-ABE library [1].
We create a benchmark containing stock market data of the scheme:
StockEvent = (TS, hour, stockId, price,volume)
in which hour values are in [0, 24) while price, volume values are in [0, 100).
Each stream is identified by its stockId. The benchmark data contains 1 million
encrypted data tuples belonging to 100 streams, which is over 100GB in size and
is available on request. We generate different types of policies, as listed in Table 1
which also shows how the policies are translated into Esper queries. Notice that
when Agg-1 or Agg-3 implementation is used, the query involves Esper’s window
operator because we rely on Esper to maintain the window’s buffer. In contrast,
Agg-1 requires no window since the cloud only transforms individual ciphertexts.
Join policies use Filter-Join operators (the Filter conditions are similar to those
of T2,T3 and T4 policies), and involves two steps: the first transforms the input
stream into StockJoinEvent stream containing the deterministic encryption of
the join attribute, the second takes two StockJoinEvent streams and produces
join outputs.
We first benchmark individual cost of various operations at the owner, the
cloud and the user by measuring their execution time. Next, we evaluate system
performance in terms of throughput and latency. Throughput is quantified by
the number of unique data tuples processed by the system per second. For join
policies, however, it is measured as the number of join outputs processed per
second. Latency is determined from the time a data tuple enters Streamforce to
the time it is sent to the user. This metric includes both queuing time and trans-
formation time. Our experiments were carried out on Amazon’s EC2 instances,
with 8 window sizes ({2, 4, 8, .., 256}) and maximum of 100 policies (mixture of
all different types) per stream.
Type Throughput Latency at saturation (ms) Latency at rate 1 tuple/sec
m1.large 125.58 (±3.32) 781 9.12 (±0.05)
m2.xlarge 160.26 (±5.88) 628 6.95 (±0.04)
m3.xlarge 248.28 (±8.54) 567 5.70 (±0.11)
Table 2: Performances for different cloud instances
5.2 Experiment Results
We start with a simple workload consisting of one stream and one T1 policy.
We run the workload on different types of EC2 instances with different capacity,
including (from small to large): m1.large, m2.xlarge and m3.xlarge. We vary
the data rate, and observe the system performance at saturation point. As seen
in Tab. 2, m3.xlarge achieves the best performance, with throughput of 249
(tuples/sec) and latency of 567ms (at 99th percentile). In contrast, m1.large
and m2.xlarge have lower throughputs at 125 and 160 (tuples/sec), and higher
latency at 781ms and 628ms. This is because m3.xlarge have more CPU power
than other types (3.5 CPU units as compared to 2.5 and 2 units). The remaining
results presented below are from experiments running on m3.xlarge instances.
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When the system first starts, the owners and users have to initialize the
cryptographic sub-systems (running Gen(.), among other things). This one-off
cost consists of a constant cost for pre-computing discrete logarithms, and a
variable cost depending on the number of encryption attributes. Fig. 4 shows
that even with 1024 encryption attributes, this initialization process takes less
than 3.5s.
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Fig. 5: Transformation for aggregate policies
Fig. 5[a] shows the cost of encryption per data tuple at the owner. If the owner
does not allow for aggregate policies, it is relatively constant at approximately
0.5s. The cost for supporting Agg-1 is the largest (over 4s), since the owner has
to encrypt the data multiple times (one for each window size). Agg-3 is also
more expensive, since two extra columns are encrypted for each tuple. The cost
of Agg-2 stays low for most of the time (its maximum value is still as high as
of that of Agg-1). This agrees with our analysis in Section 4, i.e. most of the
time the owner incurs no extra encryption per tuple, but in the worst case it has
to do 8 encryptions per tuple. Fig. 5[b] compares the transformation costs at
the cloud for different implementations of the aggregate operator. It can be seen
that for Agg-2 the cost is constant, whereas for others it is linear with the size of
the window. This is because for Agg-1 and Agg-3, the cloud needs to transform
many ciphertexts and multiply them to get the average.
The cost to generate and initialize different types of policies are depicted in
Fig. 6. Generating a new policy at the owner involves creating new transforma-
tion and decryption key for the corresponding predicate, which varies with the
policy complexity. T2 policies, for example, contain many bag-of-bit attributes
that make up complex predicates, and therefore they take longer. The cost of
initializing policies at the cloud depends on key sizes, hence it is roughly the
same for all types of policies, except for Join (which involves 2 keys from the
two input streams).
Fig. 7[a] shows the transformation cost at the cloud versus decryption cost
at the user, in which the former is in an order of magnitude bigger. This il-
lustrates that heavy computations are being outsourced to the cloud. Fig. 7[b]
shows the throughput for different policies, in which policies with high trans-
formation cost have low throughput. The highest throughput is for T1 policies,
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Fig. 7: Cost incurred and throughput achieved at the cloud
at 250 (tuples/sec). Compared to Esper’s reported throughput of over 1 million
(tuples/sec), this embarrassingly low figure clearly demonstrates the high cost of
security. However, in many stream applications in practice, such as fitness and
weather monitoring, data arrives at very low rate (in order of minutes). In these
cases, our throughput can sufficiently accommodate many streams at the same
time. Furthermore, as shown later, that independent streams can be processed in
parallel on different servers means the throughput can be improved by equipping
the cloud with more servers.
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Fig. 8: System throughput for complex workloads
Fig. 8 illustrates system throughputs for more complex workloads consisting
of multiple policies, multiple streams. We create mixed workloads containing
different types of policies. Fig. 8[a] shows that increasing the number of poli-
cies decreases the throughput, which is heavily influenced by the number of T2
policies (the workload of 2 and 4 policies contain only 1 T2 policy). This makes
sense because each tuple has to be matched with (and transformed for) more
policies, and because T2’s transformation cost is the highest. When there are
multiple streams but only one matching policy, communication overheads can
reduce the throughput. But as Fig. 8[b] indicates, having more matching policies
for every stream helps maintain the overall throughput (r, nP, nS are the data
rate per stream, number of matching policies and number of streams respec-
tively). The similar pattern is found for Join policies, as shown in Fig. 9. It can
be observed that throughput of join depends on the similarity of the two joining
streams. Specifically, when two Filter conditions are of type T2 (y < ts < z), the
output streams (for joining) have more matches and therefore are more similar
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Fig. 9: System throughput for join
(throughput of 60) than when one filter condition is of type T4 (ts%x = y) where
throughput is at 40 tuples/sec.
Finally, Fig. 10 illustrates how the system performance improves when more
servers added to the cloud. We create a workload consisting of 16 streams and 320
policies. 4 of these streams incur expensive load with 4 T2 policies per stream.
When there are more than one servers at the cloud, we consider two ways of
distributing the workload: simple — each stream occupies one machine, and bal-
anced — expensive policies are distributed evenly among the machine. The latter
may result in one stream occupying multiple servers. Fig. 10[a] shows that the
throughput increases linearly with the number of servers, which is as expected.
Also, the balanced distribution achieves lower throughputs, because in the sim-
ple distribution the servers handling light workload gets very high throughputs,
whereas with the balanced distribution all servers get low throughputs. How-
ever, at 16 servers, the balanced distribution outgrows the simple distribution,
but this throughput is obtained over duplicate tuples. This is because at 8 and
more servers, there are streams being processed by multiple servers. Fig. 10[b]
shows the latency distributions which clearly demonstrates the benefit of having
more servers. The maximum latency using 1 server is over 100s, but is reduced
to below 14s using 16 machines. The balanced distribution achieves lower maxi-
mum latency and lower variance, since all servers incur a similar load (as opposed
to a few servers incurring much heavier loads than the others).
6 Related Work
The design space concerning access control enforcement on a cloud environment
can be characterized using three properties: policy fine-grainedness, cloud trust-
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Fig. 10: Workload distribution
worthiness and cloud/client work ratio. The last property specifies how much
work the cloud and user has to perform in relation to each other: the higher
this value, the better it is to move to the cloud. When the cloud is trusted, it is
equivalent to running a private infrastructure, thus the remaining concern is pol-
icy fine-grainedness. In this setting, [4] explores access control model on top of
Aurora query model, while [8] shows how to extend XACML language to support
fine-grained policies. Such systems achieve the highest level of fine-grainedness.
When the cloud is untrusted, the security must be balanced against the fine-
grainedness and work ratio property. CryptDb [18] ensures data confidentiality
against the cloud for archival database, but it supports only coarse-grained access
control policies. Systems such as [20] employ ABE schemes for more fine-grained
policies, but the work ratio is low because the cloud only serves as a data storage
and distribution facility.
Streamforce strikes unique balance against all three properties. It considers
untrusted cloud (same as in [18]), supports a wide range of policies (with more
fine-grainedness than [20,18]), and at the same time achieves high work ratio
(the cloud shares a larger proportion of the workload than in other systems).
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented a system providing fine-grained access control
for stream data over untrusted clouds. Our system — Streamforce — allows
the owners to encrypt data before relaying them to the cloud. Encryption en-
sures both confidentiality against the cloud and access control against dishonest
users. Streamforce uses combinations of three encryption schemes: a determinis-
tic scheme, a proxy ABE scheme and a sliding-window scheme. We have showed
how the cloud can enforce access control over ciphertexts by transforming them
for authorized user, without learning the plaintexts. In Streamforce, the cloud
handles most of the heavy computations, while the users are required to do only
simple, inexpensive decryptions. We have implemented Streamforce on top of
Esper, and carried out a benchmark study of the system. The security cost is
large enough to hinder the system from achieving very high throughputs (as
compared to the maximum throughput of Esper). However, we believe the cur-
rent throughput is sufficient for many real-life applications in which data arrives
at low rate. Furthermore, we have showed that employing more servers in the
cloud can substantially improve the overall performance.
We believe that our work has put forth the first secure system for outsourcing
the enforcement of fine-grained access control for stream data. Streamforce oc-
cupies an unique position in the design space, and also opens up a wide avenue
for future work. There exists classes of applications that require much higher
throughput than currently possible in Streamforce. We acknowledge that more
effort is required to satisfy both security and demand for performance. However,
Streamforce provides a crucial first step. Our immediate plan is to incorporate
our current implementation with Storm [15], which deals with workload dis-
tribution and helps automate the scaling of our system. At the current stage,
getting the data into Streamforce is the main bottleneck: each ciphertext is over
100KB in size. We are exploring techniques to reduce the ciphertext sizes and
to improve the (incoming) data throughput.
Although Streamforce supports a wide range of policies, this range can still
be improved. As stated in [6], policies involving more complex functions such as
granularity and similarity policies are useful in many applications. Supporting
these functions over ciphertext requires more powerful homomorphic encryp-
tions, such as [11]. However, one must be careful to strike the balance between
security and performance. Our current encryption schemes do not support re-
vocation, nor do they support negative and hidden attributes. In particular,
hidden attributes are necessary when the owner wishes to hide more informa-
tion from the cloud. We plan to explore if and how existing proposals for these
features [3,17,16] can be implemented in our system. Furthermore, we would like
to relax the current adversary model which is semi-honest. A malicious adversary
may compromise data integrity, skip computation or compute using stale data.
We believe that detecting and recovering from these attacks are important for
outsourced database systems, but they may come at heavy cost of performance.
Finally, in Streamforce we have assumed that owners know which data to share
and under which policies. In reality, these decisions are not easy to make. Dif-
ferential privacy [10] can be used to reason about which data to share, while
recommendation techniques [5] can help determining the appropriate policies.
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